The United Nations General Assembly has rarely provided a more consequential setting for U.S.–Iran diplomacy. On September 22–23, 2026, American and Iranian representatives engaged in mediated talks in New York, marking the most significant diplomatic contact between the two sides in months. The discussions took place against the backdrop of an ongoing war, the unresolved crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, economic pressure on Iran, and sharply conflicting public messages from Washington and Tehran. The talks came at a moment when both governments face pressure to demonstrate that military confrontation can ultimately produce a political outcome rather than simply perpetuate another cycle of escalation.¹
The discussions did not produce an announced breakthrough. Iranian officials said significant differences remained, while U.S. officials characterized the discussions as productive and President Donald Trump suggested that diplomatic momentum existed. Reuters described the contacts as the first U.S.–Iran shuttle talks in months and reported that neither side publicly changed its position on ending the war.² The discrepancy is important. It illustrates that the central challenge is not simply reopening communication; it is establishing a negotiating framework in which both governments can make concessions without appearing to surrender the objectives that brought them to the negotiating table.
The New York discussions should therefore be understood less as a peace agreement in formation than as an early test of whether diplomacy can regain ground after months of military confrontation. The more consequential question is whether Washington and Tehran can move from exchanging positions to constructing a process in which concessions become reciprocal, verifiable, and politically sustainable. Communication has resumed. Whether that communication can be transformed into negotiations capable of producing an agreement remains uncertain.
Diplomacy Has Resumed—but Indirectly
The most significant development may be procedural rather than substantive: the United States and Iran are talking again.
The discussions were conducted through mediators, with representatives communicating between the two delegations. U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff said mediators had shuttled between the American and Iranian delegations throughout the day. President Trump subsequently described Witkoff and Jared Kushner as having had a productive meeting with Iranian intermediaries. Al Jazeera reported that accounts differed over whether U.S. and Iranian officials met directly, while Iranian state media reported contact between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Witkoff.³
That ambiguity is not necessarily a sign that diplomacy has failed. Indirect negotiations are often designed to preserve political flexibility. Neither Washington nor Tehran has to publicly acknowledge a conventional bilateral negotiation with an adversary while military confrontation remains unresolved. Mediators can transmit proposals, test possible compromises, and clarify red lines without forcing either government immediately to make a public commitment.
For Tehran, this format provides a way to explore diplomacy while maintaining its stated opposition to negotiations conducted under coercion. President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated that position in his September 23 address to the General Assembly, while stating that Iran remained open to dialogue provided negotiations were not conducted under threats or the “language of force.”⁴ For Washington, mediated discussions allow the administration to explore diplomatic possibilities without necessarily abandoning the pressure campaign that it has presented as central to its strategy.
The format nevertheless imposes limitations. Complex agreements require detailed bargaining over sequencing, verification, sanctions, military deployments, maritime access, nuclear restrictions, and enforcement. Those questions are difficult enough when negotiators are sitting directly across from one another. Indirect diplomacy adds another layer between the parties, creating opportunities for ambiguity and misunderstanding while also giving each side greater flexibility to test proposals without committing publicly to them.
The current process should therefore be viewed as a mechanism for determining whether a more substantive negotiation is possible. The existence of a diplomatic channel is significant, but it is not the same thing as the existence of a viable settlement. The next test will be whether the channel survives after the immediate diplomatic opportunity presented by the General Assembly has passed.
The Central Problem Is Sequencing
The most difficult issue may not be identifying areas of possible agreement but deciding what happens first.
Iran has linked reopening the Strait of Hormuz to changes in U.S. military and economic pressure. A senior Iranian official told Reuters on September 22 that Tehran could reopen the waterway within seven days if Washington eased military pressure and lifted its blockade of Iranian ports. The official also said Iran had delivered a proposal for ending hostilities to the United States through mediators on September 16 and that the Iranian delegation in New York had authority to pursue diplomacy.⁵ Al Jazeera reported that Iranian conditions communicated during the New York contacts included lifting the U.S. naval blockade and releasing frozen Iranian assets.⁶
Washington approaches the negotiations from a different starting point. The administration has continued to emphasize pressure and Iranian concessions, particularly concerning Iran’s nuclear capabilities, while maintaining the possibility of further military action.
Trump’s September 22 U.N. address presented that position in unusually stark terms. He said he faced a “big decision” between reaching a deal that would allow Iran to rebuild and moving to “annihilate the Islamic Republic,” adding that Iran could be driven “into hell with no chance of survival.”⁷
The language matters not simply because it was unusually severe, but because of its timing. The statement was delivered as diplomatic contacts were being pursued on the sidelines of the same General Assembly. Trump was therefore communicating two messages simultaneously: diplomacy remained possible, but the alternative to an agreement could be continued or intensified military pressure. Reuters likewise reported that Trump threatened to “annihilate” Iran if no peace deal were reached while emphasizing that preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon remained a U.S. objective.⁸ These positions create a classic sequencing dilemma.
Iran has an incentive to obtain guarantees before surrendering leverage. From Tehran’s perspective, reducing military or maritime leverage before receiving concrete concessions could leave Iran vulnerable if negotiations subsequently fail. Washington faces the opposite calculation: providing sanctions relief, reducing military pressure, or altering its maritime posture before Iran makes verifiable commitments could diminish the leverage that Washington believes is necessary to secure those commitments. Neither side therefore has a strong incentive to move first.
This problem helps explain why negotiations can continue even when the parties remain far apart. The immediate objective is not necessarily to reach the final agreement. It is to identify a sequence of reciprocal actions that makes a final agreement possible. A negotiation can make progress even before the substantive gap between the parties becomes narrow if the participants develop confidence that concessions can be exchanged rather than simply surrendered.
The distinction between reciprocal and unilateral concessions is particularly important in the current context. If Iran reopens Hormuz before receiving meaningful relief, Tehran could portray the move domestically as surrendering leverage without compensation. If Washington lifts major sanctions or substantially reduces military pressure before obtaining verifiable Iranian commitments, the administration could face pressure over having exchanged leverage for promises.
A staged process could theoretically address this problem. One side could take a limited and reversible step at the same time that the other takes a corresponding step. Maritime de-escalation could be paired with a narrowly defined reduction in military pressure. That could then be followed by additional maritime access in exchange for specific sanctions adjustments or nuclear measures. The purpose would not be to create trust immediately. It would be to create a structure in which each side has a reason to continue.
Hormuz Has Become Part of the Bargaining Architecture
The Strait of Hormuz adds another layer of complexity because it connects the diplomatic dispute to immediate global economic and security concerns. The waterway has become both a security issue and a bargaining instrument. Iran has linked reopening the Strait to changes in U.S. military and economic pressure, while the United States and other governments have emphasized the importance of restoring freedom of navigation. The issue was already incorporated into the June 2026 U.S.–Iran memorandum of understanding, which linked safe passage through Hormuz to other first-stage measures, including the lifting of the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports.⁹
This gives Tehran leverage, but it also raises the stakes for every stage of the negotiations. Hormuz is not simply another bilateral issue. It affects Gulf governments, international shipping, energy markets, and states dependent on Middle Eastern energy exports. The House of Commons Library’s review of the 2026 negotiating framework identifies freedom of navigation through Hormuz, sanctions, frozen assets, and Iran’s nuclear and missile programs as interconnected elements of the broader negotiating process.¹⁰
The issue could nevertheless provide one of the more concrete opportunities for confidence-building. Unlike some of the larger questions surrounding the future U.S.–Iran relationship, maritime access can be translated into observable actions. Ships either can or cannot transit. A blockade can be maintained or lifted. Restrictions can be specified. Procedures can be monitored.
But the same characteristics that make Hormuz a potentially useful negotiating issue make it vulnerable to disruption. A maritime incident, disagreement over the status of a vessel, or competing interpretations of an agreement could quickly become a political crisis. On September 23, the Omani navy reported that a commercial vessel was struck in an attack in the Strait, killing one crew member and prompting the evacuation of more than twenty sailors.¹¹
Such incidents demonstrate how quickly operational developments can complicate diplomacy. An effective arrangement would therefore require more than a general political commitment to freedom of navigation. It would require clearly defined procedures for implementation, verification, and responding to violations.
Hormuz illustrates the broader difficulty confronting the talks: issues that might once have been treated separately have become interconnected through the war. For Washington, maritime access is connected to freedom of navigation, regional security, and economic stability. For Tehran, it is connected to sovereignty, military pressure, and sanctions. For Gulf states, it is directly connected to economic security. That makes Hormuz both a possible entry point for diplomacy and a potential source of renewed confrontation.
The Nuclear Question Is Now Embedded in a Larger Conflict
The nuclear issue remains central to U.S. policy, but the conflict is no longer solely a nuclear dispute. Washington continues to demand restrictions on Iran’s nuclear capabilities, while Iranian officials maintain that Tehran will not surrender what they describe as its right to peaceful nuclear development. Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon remains a stated U.S. objective.¹²
At the same time, the international verification environment has become more difficult. The International Atomic Energy Agency has warned that the conflict has disrupted its ability to conduct verification activities in Iran. In its September 7 statement to the Board of Governors, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said the Agency had neither received sufficient information from Iran regarding declared nuclear material and facilities nor had access to those facilities to conduct in-field verification. He said the Agency had consequently been unable to discharge its safeguards responsibilities at declared facilities and had lost continuity of knowledge concerning previously declared inventories of enriched uranium.¹³
That development adds another layer to the negotiations. Even if Washington and Tehran were able to reach an understanding over the immediate conflict, a durable nuclear arrangement would still require mechanisms through which compliance could be established.
For Washington, preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon is a central security objective. For Tehran, the nuclear program is intertwined with questions of sovereignty, deterrence, sanctions, and national rights. The war has added another dimension: Iranian officials are now negotiating not simply over nuclear activities but over the conditions under which Iran would reduce or end military confrontation with the United States.
This creates a potential problem for diplomacy. A narrow nuclear agreement could leave unresolved the military and economic disputes that contributed to the present confrontation. Yet attempting to resolve every dispute simultaneously could make the negotiations so broad that agreement becomes increasingly difficult.
The nuclear issue may therefore have to be addressed in stages. Immediate arrangements could focus on restoring verification and establishing a baseline for monitoring. More difficult questions concerning enrichment, sanctions, and long-term nuclear restrictions could then be negotiated within a broader political framework. The important point is that verification cannot simply be assumed. It has to be rebuilt.
The Credibility Problem May Be Harder Than the Substantive Disagreements
Beneath the disputes over sanctions, nuclear restrictions, and Hormuz lies a deeper problem: neither side has strong reason to assume that the other will maintain its commitments indefinitely.
This is the credibility problem.
For Iran, sanctions relief or military de-escalation may appear insufficient if Tehran believes Washington could reverse those measures after Iranian concessions. For Washington, Iranian commitments may appear insufficient if U.S. officials believe Tehran could restore nuclear activities or alter maritime arrangements after receiving relief.
The result is a paradox. Each side wants assurances before making concessions, but the other side is reluctant to provide those assurances because it fears that doing so will weaken its bargaining position.
Verification therefore becomes central. A durable agreement would need to reduce the extent to which either government must rely on the other’s intentions. Specific commitments could be tied to observable actions, with timelines and procedures for verification. Some measures could be reversible, allowing either side to respond to violations without automatically destroying the entire framework. Such mechanisms would not eliminate distrust. They would institutionalize it.
That may be a more realistic foundation for diplomacy. The objective of an agreement is not necessarily to make the parties trust one another. It is to create rules that allow them to cooperate despite continued distrust. This is particularly important given the history of U.S.–Iran negotiations. The June 2026 memorandum of understanding attempted to connect military de-escalation, Hormuz, sanctions, frozen assets, nuclear restrictions, and longer-term negotiations within a staged framework. The agreement established an initial 60-day period for broader discussions and specified several measures to be implemented before those talks could proceed, including lifting the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports, facilitating safe passage through Hormuz, and addressing sanctions and frozen assets.¹⁴ Its subsequent breakdown demonstrates why sequencing and implementation mechanisms are as important as the headline terms of an agreement.
A future agreement will therefore need to address not only what Washington and Tehran promise to do but why each side should believe that the other will continue doing it when political circumstances change.
Public Rhetoric Is Creating a Second Negotiating Arena
The contradiction between public rhetoric and private diplomacy may be the most revealing feature of the current negotiations. Trump’s September 22 speech placed the contradiction in unusually stark terms. He presented a choice between reaching a deal with Iran and annihilating the Islamic Republic, while also indicating that an agreement remained possible.¹⁵ The following day, the first shuttle talks in months were taking place through mediators in New York.¹⁶
Pezeshkian’s response presented the opposite framing. He criticized what he described as a “bullying mentality” while maintaining that Iran remained prepared for dialogue and negotiations without threats or coercion.¹⁷
The contrast is striking, but it also reveals how diplomacy operates under wartime conditions. Leaders have domestic and strategic reasons to demonstrate resolve. A government that appears too eager to compromise can face pressure from political constituencies, military institutions, or publics that believe it is conceding too much. Statements made publicly therefore serve purposes beyond the negotiations themselves.
Rhetoric can also narrow the space available to negotiators. If Washington defines success publicly as Iranian capitulation, Tehran has less political room to accept an agreement. Conversely, if Tehran presents any concession as surrender to American pressure, Iranian negotiators have less room to compromise without facing domestic criticism.
The result is a second negotiating arena. There is the formal diplomatic process, in which mediators transmit proposals and officials explore possible compromises. There is also a public contest in which Washington and Tehran communicate with domestic audiences, regional governments, and each other through highly consequential statements. The two arenas can reinforce one another, but they can also work at cross-purposes.
Trump’s “annihilate” statement illustrates the dilemma particularly clearly. As a statement of coercive pressure, it communicates the potential consequences of failing to reach an agreement. As a diplomatic signal, however, it can also raise questions about what Tehran believes would happen after making concessions.
If Iranian officials interpret the ultimate U.S. objective as extending beyond nuclear restrictions to the survival of Iran’s political system, concessions on the nuclear issue alone may appear insufficient to guarantee Iranian security. That perception could complicate the diplomacy the threat is intended to encourage.
This does not establish that the threat has failed as a bargaining instrument. Its ultimate effect cannot yet be determined. But it demonstrates the inherent tension between coercive diplomacy and negotiated compromise: pressure may create incentives to negotiate while simultaneously reducing the trust required to reach an agreement.
For diplomacy to advance, the parties eventually have to move from demonstrating what they can do to explaining what they are prepared to exchange.
Regional Mediators May Prove More Important Than the U.N. Itself
The United Nations has provided something the conflict badly needs: proximity. American and Iranian officials were already in New York, surrounded by diplomats and regional governments with an interest in preventing further escalation. The General Assembly therefore created an unusual opportunity for multiple diplomatic channels to operate simultaneously. However, the United Nations itself is not resolving the substantive dispute.
Its importance lies primarily in providing diplomatic access, international visibility, and a setting in which multiple actors can engage. The actual mechanics of U.S.–Iran communication continue to depend heavily on intermediaries capable of communicating with both governments.
Qatar’s role is particularly significant. Doha has been involved in facilitating communication between Washington and Tehran, including during the September 22–23 discussions. Qatar also said it was working with Pakistan to reduce tensions between Washington and Tehran, safeguard freedom of navigation through Hormuz, and promote regional stability.¹⁸ Oman has likewise been involved in maritime diplomacy surrounding the waterway.
Regional mediation matters because Gulf governments have strong incentives to reduce tensions. They bear many of the immediate economic and security consequences of prolonged confrontation, particularly when maritime traffic and energy supplies are threatened.
The September talks were therefore accompanied by a wider regional diplomatic effort. Trump met with leaders and senior officials from Gulf Cooperation Council states, Türkiye, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, while Qatar continued discussions with Iranian officials.¹⁹
At the same time, expanding the number of participants creates another challenge: more actors mean more interests to reconcile. A bilateral settlement may be easier to negotiate, while a broader arrangement may be more durable if affected states have a role in implementation.
What Would Meaningful Progress Actually Look Like?
The immediate measure of progress should not be whether Washington and Tehran announce a final agreement. Given the depth of their differences, that would be an unusually demanding standard for an initial round of renewed contact.
More useful indicators are procedural and substantive.
- Continuity. If the mediated channel survives beyond the General Assembly and additional meetings are scheduled, that would indicate that both governments see sufficient value in continuing the process.
- Specific sequencing. Negotiations become more meaningful when the parties begin discussing what each side would do, when it would do it, and what it would receive in return.
- Verification. Agreements become more durable when compliance can be observed rather than inferred.
- Establishing mechanisms for managing violations. If a minor incident can automatically terminate an agreement, each side has an incentive to interpret incidents in the most threatening way. A more durable process would establish procedures for investigating disputes and responding proportionately.
- Evidence that the parties can separate immediate de-escalation from longer-term political disputes.
That distinction may be critical. It may not be necessary for Washington and Tehran to resolve their entire relationship before they can establish a functioning maritime arrangement. Nor must every question concerning Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions, and regional security necessarily be resolved simultaneously. A staged process could allow the parties to establish limited agreements, test compliance, and build from those results. That would not guarantee success. It would, however, reduce the risk that every unresolved issue becomes a veto over every other issue.
The Larger Test Is Whether Military Leverage Can Become Political Leverage
The U.S.–Iran talks highlight a broader problem in conflict diplomacy: military pressure can alter the bargaining environment, but it does not automatically produce a political settlement.
Washington has demonstrated its willingness to use economic and military pressure to pursue its objectives. Tehran has demonstrated that it retains instruments capable of imposing costs and disrupting regional security. Neither development, by itself, resolves the underlying dispute. The central question is whether those forms of leverage can be converted into negotiated concessions.
That requires a transition from coercion as an end in itself to coercion as part of a bargaining strategy. Military pressure may change calculations, but eventually the parties must have an off-ramp through which pressure can be exchanged for political concessions.
Otherwise, a cycle can emerge in which resistance to pressure is interpreted as evidence that additional pressure is necessary, while additional pressure produces greater resistance. The current talks therefore represent a test of whether the United States can translate military and economic leverage into a political process that produces reciprocal concessions, and whether Iran can translate its remaining sources of leverage—including Hormuz—into negotiated outcomes rather than continued confrontation.
The credibility problem makes this particularly difficult. Tehran needs reason to believe that concessions will produce sustained benefits. Washington needs reason to believe that Iranian commitments will remain enforceable after pressure is reduced. The negotiation therefore has to produce more than a list of concessions. It has to produce a structure that changes the incentives surrounding those concessions.
An Opening, Not Yet a Breakthrough
The New York talks are significant because communication has resumed at a moment when military confrontation and political rhetoric have made diplomacy extraordinarily difficult. The initial discussions also demonstrate how much remains unresolved. Iran and the United States continue to differ over sanctions, military pressure, maritime access, nuclear restrictions, and the sequencing of concessions. Iranian officials have said the sides remain far apart, while American officials have emphasized momentum and the possibility of an eventual settlement.²⁰
The most consequential question is therefore not whether the United Nations talks produced an immediate agreement. They did not. The more important question is whether the mediated channel can survive long enough to transform preliminary contacts into structured negotiations.
That will depend on whether Washington and Tehran can create a process in which neither side has to make the first unilateral concession while both have sufficient incentives to continue negotiating. The United Nations has provided the setting. Regional mediators have helped create the channel. The next stage requires something considerably more difficult: converting communication into a sequence of reciprocal, verifiable steps.
The immediate opportunity may lie in separating what can be negotiated now from what will require a longer political process. Maritime de-escalation, humanitarian measures, restoration of nuclear verification, and limited confidence-building steps could provide more manageable starting points than attempting to resolve the nuclear question, sanctions regime, regional security architecture, and the future U.S.–Iran relationship simultaneously.
Yet there is an equally important risk. If every issue becomes conditional on the resolution of every other issue, negotiations can become trapped in an all-or-nothing structure. A disagreement over sanctions can prevent progress on Hormuz; a disagreement over nuclear restrictions can prevent progress on sanctions; and disputes over military deployments can prevent either side from taking the first step. The challenge for the negotiators is therefore architectural.
They must determine which issues can be separated, which must be linked, and which can be addressed sequentially. They must also determine what each side can offer that the other actually values, rather than simply exchanging concessions that appear significant politically but do little to change the underlying incentives.
For now, the New York talks represent a narrow diplomatic opening inside a much broader conflict. Their significance lies not in the appearance of agreement but in the possibility of constructing a process through which agreement could eventually become possible.
The United Nations has created the setting. Regional mediators have helped create the channel. Hormuz provides an immediate issue around which reciprocal measures could potentially be tested. The nuclear issue provides the longer-term strategic challenge. And the extraordinary rhetoric surrounding the talks—including Trump’s public statement that he could “annihilate” the Islamic Republic—underscores how far the parties remain from a conventional diplomatic relationship.²¹
Whether this opening develops into meaningful diplomacy will depend on what happens next: whether the parties continue talking, whether they begin negotiating specific sequences of reciprocal action, and whether they can build verification and enforcement mechanisms capable of surviving the profound distrust that brought them to the negotiating table in the first place.
The New York talks therefore should not yet be understood as a peace agreement in formation. Their more immediate significance is whether they created the beginnings of a negotiating architecture capable of producing one.
The central question is no longer simply whether Washington and Tehran are willing to talk. They are. The harder question is whether they can construct a form of diplomacy that survives the contradiction at the heart of the current process: the two sides are being asked to negotiate an end to a war while still using the language and instruments of coercion that have defined it.
Notes
- Philip Loft, “US-Iran Ceasefire and Nuclear Talks in 2026,” House of Commons Library Research Briefing CBP-10637, July 2, 2026.
https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/CBP-10637/ - Reuters, “Hope for Progress after US, Iran Hold First Shuttle Talks in Months,” September 23, 2026.
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hope-progress-after-us-iran-hold-first-shuttle-talks-months-2026-09-23/ - Al Jazeera, “US, Iran Hold Mediated UNGA Talks on Ending War, Opening Strait of Hormuz,” September 23, 2026.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/23/us-iran-hold-mediated-unga-talks-on-ending-war-opening-strait-of-hormuz - Masoud Pezeshkian, address to the 81st United Nations General Assembly, September 23, 2026, as reported by contemporaneous coverage. See Reuters, “Hope for Progress after US, Iran Hold First Shuttle Talks in Months.”
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hope-progress-after-us-iran-hold-first-shuttle-talks-months-2026-09-23/ - Reuters, “Iran Ready to Reopen Strait of Hormuz if US Eases Military Pressure and Lifts Blockade,” September 22, 2026.
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-ready-reopen-strait-hormuz-if-us-eases-military-pressure-lifts-blockade-2026-09-22/ - Al Jazeera, “US, Iran Hold Mediated UNGA Talks on Ending War, Opening Strait of Hormuz.”
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/23/us-iran-hold-mediated-unga-talks-on-ending-war-opening-strait-of-hormuz - Donald J. Trump, “Speech: Donald Trump Addresses the 81st Session of the United Nations,” September 22, 2026, transcript, Roll Call Factbase.
https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-speech-81st-united-nations-general-assembly-september-22-2026/ - Reuters, “Trump Warns in UN Speech He Could ‘Annihilate’ Iran without Peace Deal,” September 22, 2026.
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/trump-set-whirlwind-un-meetings-with-wars-iran-ukraine-agenda-2026-09-22/ - Loft, “US-Iran Ceasefire and Nuclear Talks in 2026.”
https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/CBP-10637/ - Ibid.
- CBS News, “Iran War Updates: U.S. and Iran Hold First Talks since June after Trump Threatens Regime with Annihilation,” September 23, 2026.
https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-trump-un-speech-annihilate-threat-talks-resume/ - The White House, “President Trump at the United Nations: ‘While Others Have Talked, I Have Acted,’” September 22, 2026.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/09/president-trump-at-the-united-nations-while-others-have-talked-i-have-acted/ - International Atomic Energy Agency, “IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors,” September 7, 2026.
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-7-september-2026 - Loft, “US-Iran Ceasefire and Nuclear Talks in 2026.”
https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/CBP-10637/ - Trump, “Speech: Donald Trump Addresses the 81st Session of the United Nations.”
https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-speech-81st-united-nations-general-assembly-september-22-2026/ - Reuters, “Hope for Progress after US, Iran Hold First Shuttle Talks in Months.”
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hope-progress-after-us-iran-hold-first-shuttle-talks-months-2026-09-23/ - Reuters, “Hope for Progress after US, Iran Hold First Shuttle Talks in Months.”
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hope-progress-after-us-iran-hold-first-shuttle-talks-months-2026-09-23/ - Al Jazeera, “US, Iran Hold Mediated UNGA Talks on Ending War, Opening Strait of Hormuz.”
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/23/us-iran-hold-mediated-unga-talks-on-ending-war-opening-strait-of-hormuz - Ibid.
- Reuters, “Hope for Progress after US, Iran Hold First Shuttle Talks in Months.”
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hope-progress-after-us-iran-hold-first-shuttle-talks-months-2026-09-23/ - Trump, “Speech: Donald Trump Addresses the 81st Session of the United Nations.”
https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-speech-81st-united-nations-general-assembly-september-22-2026/
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